

Greater San Francisco: The Case for Bay Area Municipal Consolidation

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Abstract

The San Francisco Bay Area is home to 7.7 million people and generates \$1.3 trillion in annual GDP, making it one of the most economically productive regions on Earth. Yet this world-class economy is governed by a fragmented patchwork of 9 counties, 101 municipalities, 27 transit agencies, and roughly 200 special districts—none of which answer to a single regional authority. This fragmentation produces a housing crisis driven by 101 independent zoning regimes, a transit system where 27 agencies fail to coordinate schedules or fares, and fiscal disparities where the richest jurisdiction collects four times the per-capita revenue of the poorest. This report argues that the Bay Area should consolidate into a single metropolitan government—a “Greater San Francisco”—drawing on the region’s own history of consolidation attempts, domestic and international case studies, and quantitative evidence on the costs of fragmentation. Two consolidation paths are analyzed: a gradual approach beginning with transit unification, and an all-at-once merger modeled on New York City’s 1898 consolidation. Both paths converge on the same destination: a unified city with a borough system preserving local identity, a single planning authority capable of building housing at scale, and a transit network worthy of the region’s ambitions.

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1 Introduction

The San Francisco Bay Area presents a paradox. By any economic measure, it is one of the most successful regions in the world: its combined GDP of \$1.3 trillion would rank it as the 16th-largest national economy, ahead of Mexico and Indonesia ([Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2024](#)). It is the global center of the technology industry, home to companies whose products are used by billions of people. Its research universities—Stanford, Berkeley, UCSF—are among the most productive in the world. Its natural setting, ringing one of the planet’s great harbors, is spectacular.

And yet the Bay Area is governed as if it were not a single region at all. Nine counties, 101 municipalities, 27 transit agencies, and roughly 200 special districts divide the region into a fragmented patchwork where no one is in charge of the whole ([SPUR, 2025](#)). The consequences of this fragmentation are visible everywhere: a housing crisis that has priced out a generation of workers, a transit system where riders must navigate incompatible fare systems and uncoordinated schedules, and fiscal disparities so extreme that wealthy enclaves can afford lavish services while neighboring cities struggle to maintain basic infrastructure.

This report argues that the Bay Area should consolidate into a single metropolitan government: **Greater San Francisco**. The argument proceeds in six parts. Section 2 documents the current state of governance fragmentation. Section 3 traces the long history of failed consolidation proposals, from the 1856 Consolidation Act to the present day. Section 4 examines consolidation case studies from the United States and abroad. Section 5 presents the quantitative evidence for consolidation’s benefits. Section 6 outlines two concrete paths forward. Section 7 addresses the most common objections. The report concludes that the status quo is not a neutral default—it is an active choice that imposes enormous costs on the region.

2 The Fragmented Bay Area

2.1 Nine Counties, One Hundred and One Cities

The San Francisco Bay Area comprises nine counties arrayed around the San Francisco Bay: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. Together they span approximately 7,000 square miles and contain 7.7 million people as of 2025 ([Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 2024](#)). Within these nine counties are 101 incorporated municipalities, ranging from San Jose (population 1 million) to Colma (population 1,500).

Table 1: Bay Area Counties: Population, Area, and Municipalities

County	Pop. (2024)	Area (mi ²)	Cities	County Seat
Alameda	1,641,869	821	14	Oakland
Contra Costa	1,146,626	804	19	Martinez
Marin	258,826	828	11	San Rafael
Napa	137,744	789	5	Napa
San Francisco	865,933	47	1	San Francisco
San Mateo	757,666	455	20	Redwood City
Santa Clara	1,903,198	1,304	15	San Jose
Solano	441,098	910	7	Fairfield
Sonoma	479,748	1,768	9	Santa Rosa
Total	7,632,708	7,726	101	

Each of these 101 municipalities maintains its own city council, planning department, zoning code, police force (in most cases), and set of local ordinances. Each county maintains its own board of supervisors, assessor, sheriff, and social services apparatus. The result is a governance structure of extraordinary redundancy.

2.2 The Proliferation of Special Districts and Agencies

Beyond the counties and cities, the Bay Area is home to a sprawling ecosystem of special-purpose districts. Approximately 200 special districts handle functions ranging from water supply to fire protection to mosquito abatement. There are 27 public transit agencies—more than any other metropolitan area in the United States ([Seamless Bay Area, 2021](#)). Overlapping these are regional bodies like the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission.

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of government entities across the nine counties. The total exceeds 470 distinct governmental bodies—all operating within a single metropolitan labor market.




Figure 1: Governance fragmentation across Bay Area counties. Each county contains dozens of overlapping governmental entities with independent authority.

2.3 How We Got Here

The Bay Area's fragmentation is not the result of careful institutional design. It is an accident of 19th-century political boundaries imposed on a region whose economic geography has long since outgrown them. California's original counties were drawn in 1850, when the Bay Area's total population was approximately 30,000 ([California Department of Finance, 2024](#)). The boundaries made rough sense for an agrarian economy where travel was slow. They make no sense for a 21st-century metropolitan area where a worker in San Jose commutes to an office in San Francisco, sends her children to school in a third jurisdiction, and depends on water infrastructure managed by a fourth.

3 A History of Failed Consolidation

The idea of unifying the Bay Area under a single government is not new. It has been proposed, debated, and defeated repeatedly for over a century. Understanding why past proposals failed is essential to designing one that can succeed.

3.1 The 1856 Consolidation Act

The first and only successful consolidation in Bay Area history occurred in 1856. The California legislature passed the Consolidation Act, which merged the previously separate

City of San Francisco and County of San Francisco into a single entity: the consolidated City and County of San Francisco ([State of California, 1856](#)). As part of the same legislation, San Mateo County was carved out of the southern portion of the original San Francisco County, with a line drawn just north of San Bruno Mountain.

This act created the unique governmental structure that San Francisco retains to this day: it is simultaneously a city and a county, the only such entity in California. The consolidation was motivated by a desire to rationalize governance in the chaotic Gold Rush era, when overlapping city and county authorities had produced corruption and inefficiency.

3.2 The Greater San Francisco Movement (1907–1914)

The 1906 earthquake and fire destroyed much of San Francisco and created an urgent need for infrastructure investment—particularly the Hetch Hetchy water system. The city’s Chamber of Commerce saw an opportunity: a larger tax base could fund the massive reconstruction effort. In 1907, they formed the Greater San Francisco Association, which proposed absorbing the surrounding communities into an expanded San Francisco ([Hoodline, 2017](#)).

The plan was ambitious. Under the proposed Wolfe Amendment to the state constitution, San Francisco would annex cities across the Bay, including Oakland, Berkeley, Richmond, and San Leandro, as well as communities on the Peninsula. The new “Greater San Francisco” would have been organized as a borough system, similar to New York City’s five boroughs.

Opposition was fierce. Oakland, the East Bay’s largest city, organized a vigorous “no” campaign. Citizens in surrounding communities feared losing local control to San Francisco’s political machine. When the Wolfe Amendment came to a statewide vote in 1914, it was defeated. The Greater San Francisco movement had failed.

3.3 Subsequent Attempts and Partial Reforms

The defeat of the Wolfe Amendment did not end consolidation efforts, but subsequent proposals were smaller in scope:

- **1921:** A proposal to consolidate all cities in Alameda County into a single East Bay city was rejected by voters.
- **1928:** San Francisco attempted again to absorb San Mateo County; San Mateo voters rejected the proposal.
- **1961:** The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) was established as a voluntary council of governments—a regional planning body with no binding

authority.

- **1977:** The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) was created by the state legislature to coordinate transportation funding, but not to operate or consolidate transit agencies.
- **2017:** After years of discussion, ABAG and MTC merged their staffs while retaining separate governing boards—a half-measure that consolidated bureaucracy without consolidating authority (Greenbelt Alliance, 2017).
- **2024:** SB 1031, the Connect Bay Area Act, was introduced to study consolidation of the 27 transit agencies and authorize a regional transit funding measure (California State Legislature, 2022).

Figure 2 presents a visual timeline of these proposals and their outcomes.




Figure 2: Timeline of Bay Area consolidation proposals, institutional reforms, and defeats from 1850 to 2024. Green markers indicate successful reforms; red markers indicate defeated proposals.

3.4 Why Past Proposals Failed

The pattern is consistent. Consolidation proposals in the Bay Area have failed for three recurring reasons:

1. **Suburban resistance to absorption by a central city.** Oakland residents in 1914 and San Mateo residents in 1928 did not want to be governed by San Francisco. This is a universal pattern in American consolidation politics: suburbs fear losing autonomy to a larger, often more diverse, central city.
2. **No crisis sufficient to overcome inertia.** Successful consolidations elsewhere have often been catalyzed by fiscal crisis (Jacksonville), corruption scandals, or existential threats. The Bay Area's prosperity—paradoxically—has insulated it from the kind of shock that forces institutional change.

3. **Incremental reforms as a pressure valve.** Each time consolidation has been proposed, the response has been to create a new regional body (ABAG, MTC, BART) that addresses the immediate concern without consolidating political authority. These half-measures relieve political pressure while perpetuating fragmentation.

4 Consolidation Elsewhere: Case Studies

The Bay Area is not the first region to confront the costs of fragmented governance. Several American cities and international metropolises have consolidated successfully, offering lessons for a Bay Area effort.

4.1 American City-County Consolidations

4.1.1 New York City (1898)

The most consequential municipal consolidation in American history occurred on January 1, 1898, when the City of Brooklyn, western Queens County, Staten Island, and the Bronx merged with Manhattan to form the City of Greater New York ([Wikipedia, 2025](#)). The consolidation was driven by a desire to compete with Chicago for the title of America’s largest city, and by the practical need to coordinate infrastructure across the harbor.

The consolidation was bitterly opposed, particularly in Brooklyn, which was then America’s fourth-largest city. The referendum passed by a razor-thin margin: 64,744 votes in favor to 64,467 against. Yet the result was transformative. The unified city was able to build the subway system, the water supply network, and the public school system that made New York the 20th century’s preeminent global city. It is, as one historian notes, “simply impossible to imagine the rise of New York City as one of the pre-eminent global cities without the 19th-century act of consolidation” ([Gollither, 2020](#)).

The New York model is directly relevant to the Bay Area. Both regions have a dominant central city (Manhattan/San Francisco) surrounded by independent communities with distinct identities. Both face the challenge of coordinating infrastructure across water. And both have experienced fierce resistance from communities that fear absorption. The key difference is that New York succeeded—and the benefits have been incalculable.

4.1.2 Jacksonville–Duval County, Florida (1968)

Jacksonville’s consolidation with Duval County in 1968 was driven by a perfect storm of crises: the city had lost its accreditation for public schools, corruption scandals had engulfed the city government, and the tax base was eroding as residents fled to unincorporated areas ([Jaxson Magazine, 2017](#)). Voters approved the merger in a referendum, creating a consolidated government covering 875 square miles.

The results were largely positive. Jacksonville’s bond rating improved, enabling major infrastructure investments. The city attracted an NFL franchise and experienced sustained economic development. Population grew from 529,000 at consolidation to 985,000 today.

4.1.3 Nashville–Davidson County, Tennessee (1962)

Nashville’s 1962 consolidation with Davidson County produced one of the most successful merged governments in the United States. The consolidated city ranked in the top six nationally for population growth from 1970 through 2010. Major economic development—including the growth of Nashville as a music and healthcare hub—was facilitated by unified planning authority ([Municipal Technical Advisory Service, 2014](#)).

4.1.4 Indianapolis–Marion County, Indiana (1970)

Indianapolis’s “Unigov” was unusual in that it was enacted by state legislation rather than referendum, pushed through by Republican Mayor Richard Lugar. The consolidated government enhanced economic development effectiveness, with substantial downtown investment that “would not have occurred without Unigov” ([Center for Governmental Research, 2010](#)). However, the consolidation did not include school districts, police, or fire services, resulting in a partial merger.

4.1.5 Louisville–Jefferson County, Kentucky (2003)

Louisville’s 2003 merger with Jefferson County is the most recent major U.S. consolidation. A ten-year retrospective found that property tax rates had remained steady or slightly declined, and that the merger had not produced the tax increases opponents had predicted ([Abell Foundation, 2011](#)). However, the merger has been criticized for reducing political representation for African Americans.

Figure 3 compares population growth across consolidated cities.




Figure 3: Population growth from pre-consolidation to present for major U.S. city-county consolidations. All consolidated cities experienced substantial growth.

4.2 International Models

4.2.1 Greater London Authority (2000)

London’s governance offers perhaps the most relevant international model for the Bay Area. The Greater London Authority (GLA), established in 2000 following a 1998 referendum, provides a two-tier government: a directly elected Mayor and 25-member London Assembly at the metropolitan level, with 32 borough councils retaining local authority ([Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1999](#)). The boroughs handle education, social services, and local planning, while the GLA oversees strategic planning, transportation (through Transport for London), policing, and economic development.

The London model demonstrates that consolidation need not mean the elimination of local government. The borough system preserves local identity while enabling metropolitan-scale coordination. Transport for London, in particular, is a powerful example of what a unified transit authority can achieve: integrated fares, coordinated schedules, and a coherent network map that riders can actually use.

4.2.2 Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1943)

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government governs a region of 14 million people through a two-tier structure: 23 special wards (the former City of Tokyo) with elected leaders and councils, plus 26 cities, five towns, and eight villages in the western suburbs ([Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2024](#)). The metropolitan governor is directly elected and

oversees services including water supply, sewerage, and major infrastructure.

Tokyo’s model demonstrates that even very large metropolitan areas can be governed under a unified structure while preserving local autonomy. The special wards function similarly to boroughs, handling local services while the metropolitan government handles region-wide functions.

4.2.3 Toronto Amalgamation (1998)

Toronto’s 1998 amalgamation—imposed by the provincial government over fierce local opposition—offers important cautionary lessons. Seven municipalities were merged into a single City of Toronto. While the amalgamation improved service equity across formerly disparate municipalities and created valuable oversight institutions (Auditor General, Integrity Commissioner), it failed to deliver the cost savings the province had promised (Slack and Côté, 2018). Per-household expenditures increased for most services after amalgamation. The amalgamation also reduced civic engagement and deepened divisions between the old City of Toronto and the suburbs (Slack and Bird, 2013).

The Toronto experience suggests that consolidation should be designed to improve coordination and equity—not sold primarily as a cost-cutting measure. It also suggests the importance of voluntary engagement rather than top-down imposition.

Table 2: Consolidation Case Studies: Key Features

City	Year	Pop. (current)	Borough System	Key Outcome
New York	1898	8.3M	Yes (5)	Global city; subway; unified infrastructure
Nashville	1962	715K	No	Top-6 pop. growth 1970–2010
Jacksonville	1968	985K	No	Bond rating improved; NFL franchise
Indianapolis	1970	887K	No	Downtown revitalization
Toronto	1998	2.8M	No	Service equity; costs increased
London (GLA)	2000	9.0M	Yes (32)	TfL; strategic planning; elected mayor
Louisville	2003	782K	No	Stable taxes; representation concerns

4.3 Lessons for the Bay Area

Several patterns emerge from these case studies:

1. **Borough systems preserve local identity.** The most successful large-scale consolidations (New York, London, Tokyo) use a two-tier structure where boroughs

or wards retain local authority while the metropolitan government handles region-wide functions.

2. **Transit unification is transformative.** Every consolidated metro has benefited from unified transit planning. Transport for London, New York’s MTA, and Tokyo’s coordinated rail network demonstrate the advantages of a single authority.
3. **Consolidation enables infrastructure at scale.** The unified tax base and planning authority that come with consolidation make it possible to invest in infrastructure that fragmented jurisdictions cannot individually justify.
4. **Cost savings are not guaranteed.** Toronto’s experience shows that consolidation should not be sold primarily as a money-saving measure. The real benefits are in improved coordination, equity, and regional competitiveness.
5. **Political resistance is universal but surmountable.** Every successful consolidation faced fierce opposition. New York’s passed by 277 votes. The key is having a compelling crisis or vision.

5 The Quantitative Case for Consolidation

5.1 Population and Economic Scale

If the Bay Area were governed as a single entity, it would be the third-largest city in the United States by population (7.7 million), behind only New York (8.3 million) and Los Angeles (3.9 million city proper, 13 million metro). Its combined GDP of \$1.3 trillion would rank it among the top five U.S. metropolitan economies and ahead of most countries ([Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2024](#)).




Figure 4: Bay Area combined population compared to other major world metropolitan areas. The Bay Area's 7.7 million residents make it comparable to London and larger than most U.S. metros.




Figure 5: Bay Area combined GDP compared to other major metros. At \$1.3 trillion, the Bay Area's output would rank it among the world's most productive urban economies.

Yet this enormous population and economic output has no unified political voice. The Bay Area has no mayor, no city council, no single entity that can speak for the region in state or federal politics. This is a structural disadvantage in competing for federal infrastructure funding, attracting international investment, and negotiating with the state legislature. New York, London, and Tokyo all have a single leader who can act on behalf of the entire metropolitan area. The Bay Area does not.

5.2 Housing: The Cost of Fragmented Zoning

The Bay Area’s housing crisis is, at its core, a governance crisis. The region needs to build 441,176 housing units in the 2023–2031 RHNA cycle to meet demand ([Association of Bay Area Governments, 2023](#)). But responsibility for zoning and permitting is distributed across 101 municipalities, each with its own planning commission, zoning code, and political dynamics.

The result is predictable: wealthy communities zone for low density, block multifamily housing, and push development costs onto their neighbors. Figure 6 shows the extreme variation in housing prices across Bay Area jurisdictions—from \$7.5 million median in Atherton to \$480,000 in Vallejo—a 15:1 ratio within a single metropolitan labor market.




Figure 6: Median home prices across Bay Area cities compared to consolidated metros. The enormous within-region variation reflects 101 independent zoning regimes.

RHNA compliance is abysmal. Figure 7 shows that most Bay Area jurisdictions produce only a fraction of their allocated housing targets. Wealthy suburbs like Los Altos, Cupertino, and Atherton achieve compliance rates below 20%, while even the core cities fall short. No jurisdiction comes close to meeting its full RHNA allocation.




Figure 7: RHNA housing production compliance by jurisdiction. No Bay Area jurisdiction meets its full target; wealthy suburbs are the worst offenders.

A unified Greater San Francisco would have a single zoning authority capable of allocating housing production across the region based on transit access, infrastructure capacity, and equity—not the parochial preferences of 101 city councils. This is how London, Tokyo, and New York handle housing: regional planning with local implementation, not 101 independent vetoes.

5.3 Transit: Twenty-Seven Agencies, Zero Coordination

The Bay Area operates 27 public transit agencies—more than any comparable metropolitan area ([Seamless Bay Area, 2021](#)). Figure 8 illustrates the contrast: London has Transport for London, New York has the MTA, Tokyo has two closely coordinated operators. The Bay Area has BART, Muni, Caltrain, AC Transit, VTA, SamTrans, Golden Gate Transit, and 20 more agencies, each with its own fare structure, schedule, map, and branding.




Figure 8: Number of transit agencies by metropolitan area. The Bay Area’s 27 agencies are an outlier among major world metros.

The costs of this fragmentation are borne by riders. Transfers between agencies typically require paying a separate fare. Schedules are not coordinated, creating long waits at transfer points. Maps and wayfinding are inconsistent. As the advocacy group Seamless Bay Area has documented, “it’s no one’s job to provide a seamless, integrated transportation network in the Bay Area—and no dedicated funding source exists to support it—so it doesn’t happen” ([Seamless Bay Area, 2021](#)).




Figure 9: Mean commute times across Bay Area counties (left) and comparator metros (right). Contra Costa County residents endure the longest commutes at 37 minutes.

5.4 Fiscal Disparities and the Tax Base

Governance fragmentation creates stark fiscal disparities. Figure 10 shows per-capita revenue across Bay Area jurisdictions: Atherton collects \$8,500 per resident while East Palo Alto—located just three miles away—collects \$2,100. This 4:1 ratio means that wealthy enclaves can afford excellent services, parks, and schools while neighboring communities struggle with underfunded police, deteriorating infrastructure, and inadequate social services.




Figure 10: Per-capita revenue across Bay Area jurisdictions. The richest-to-poorest ratio exceeds 4:1, reflecting deep fiscal inequality within a single metro area.

A consolidated Greater San Francisco would pool the regional tax base, enabling equitable distribution of resources. This does not mean that wealthy areas would be stripped of services. The London model demonstrates that boroughs can retain local taxing authority while the metropolitan government ensures a baseline of services across the region.

5.5 Democratic Accountability

The Bay Area's overlapping jurisdictions create a democratic deficit. Most residents cannot name their county supervisor, their water district board member, or their transit agency director. Special district elections—which control billions in public spending—routinely see turnout below 10%. The proliferation of governing bodies dilutes accountability: when something goes wrong, no one is clearly responsible.

A unified Greater San Francisco with a directly elected mayor and metropolitan council would create a single point of accountability for regional outcomes. Voters would know who to hold responsible for housing, transit, and fiscal policy—just as Londoners can hold their Mayor accountable for Transport for London’s performance.

6 Two Paths to Consolidation

How would the Bay Area actually consolidate? Two models are available, each with different political requirements and timelines. Figure 11 illustrates both paths.




Figure 11: Two paths to consolidation. The gradual path (left) proceeds through transit unification, regional planning, and service consolidation over 15–20 years. The all-at-once path (right) seeks a single constitutional or legislative act.

6.1 Path A: Gradual Consolidation

The gradual path builds consolidation incrementally, starting with the areas where fragmentation is most costly and political resistance is weakest:

Phase 1 (Years 1–3): Unified Transit Authority. Merge the 27 transit agencies into a single Bay Area Transit Authority, modeled on Transport for London. SB 1031 has already begun this process by mandating a consolidation study ([California State Legislature, 2022](#)). A unified agency would integrate fares, coordinate schedules, and rationalize routes.

Phase 2 (Years 4–8): Regional Planning and Housing Authority. Establish a regional planning body with binding authority over zoning and housing production,

replacing the current system where ABAG sets targets that 101 municipalities ignore. The state legislature would need to grant this body enforcement power.

Phase 3 (Years 8–15): Service Consolidation. Consolidate overlapping special districts for water, fire, waste, and other services. LAFCO already has the authority to initiate district consolidation ([California Association of Local Agency Formation Commissions, 2017](#)).

Phase 4 (Years 15–20): Full Political Merger. Once transit, planning, and services are consolidated, the final step is political unification: creating a Greater San Francisco with a directly elected mayor, a metropolitan council, and a borough system based on the nine existing counties.

The advantage of the gradual path is political feasibility. Each phase can demonstrate concrete benefits before the next phase begins, building public support over time. The disadvantage is that it takes decades, and political momentum may dissipate between phases.

6.2 Path B: All-at-Once Consolidation

The all-at-once path seeks to create Greater San Francisco in a single act, modeled on New York’s 1898 consolidation. This would require either:

- A state constitutional amendment, requiring two-thirds legislative approval and majority voter approval statewide; or
- A LAFCO reorganization process under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Act, which allows consolidation of cities and counties through local petition and vote.

The constitutional amendment route is more politically difficult but produces a more durable result. The LAFCO route is legally available but has never been used for a consolidation of this scale.

6.3 Governance Design: The Borough System

Under either path, the consolidation should preserve local identity through a borough system. Figure 12 illustrates the proposed governance structure.




Figure 12: Current fragmented governance structure (left) vs. proposed Greater San Francisco with borough system (right). The borough system preserves local identity while enabling metropolitan-scale coordination.

The proposed structure would include:

- A **directly elected Mayor** of Greater San Francisco, serving as the region’s chief executive and national/international representative.
- A **Metropolitan Council** with proportional representation from across the region.
- **Nine boroughs** (based on the current nine counties), each with an elected borough president and local council. Boroughs would retain authority over local zoning details, neighborhood services, and community institutions.
- A **unified transit authority** operating all public transit under a single fare system.
- A **regional planning authority** with binding power over housing production, infrastructure, and land use.

This structure mirrors the Greater London Authority, which has successfully governed 9 million people through a similar two-tier model since 2000.

7 Objections and Responses

7.1 “Local Control Is Sacred”

The most common objection to consolidation is that it threatens local control. But “local control” in the Bay Area context often means the ability of wealthy suburbs to exclude housing, avoid regional responsibilities, and externalize costs onto their neighbors. When

Atherton zones exclusively for single-family homes on one-acre lots, it is exercising local control—but at the expense of the entire region’s housing supply.

The borough system preserves genuine local control over neighborhood character, schools, and community services. What it eliminates is the ability of individual jurisdictions to veto regional housing, transit, and infrastructure needs. This is the tradeoff that London, New York, and Tokyo have all accepted.

7.2 “It Will Never Pass Politically”

This objection is an argument for the status quo, not against consolidation. New York’s 1898 consolidation passed by 277 votes. Jacksonville’s consolidation was catalyzed by a school accreditation crisis. Political impossibility is a function of political conditions, not a permanent fact.

The gradual path (starting with transit consolidation) offers a politically feasible entry point. Transit coordination is popular with voters—SB 1031 received broad support. Each successful phase builds the case for the next.

7.3 “Toronto’s Merger Was a Disaster”

Toronto’s amalgamation is often cited as a cautionary tale. But the Toronto case is specific to its context: the merger was imposed by a provincial government seeking cost savings (which did not materialize) over fierce local opposition. The Bay Area consolidation proposed here is different in structure (borough system, not elimination of local government) and in goals (improved coordination and equity, not cost cutting).

Moreover, even Toronto’s critics acknowledge that the amalgamation improved service equity and created valuable oversight institutions ([Slack and Côté, 2018](#)). The lesson from Toronto is not that consolidation is always bad—it is that consolidation should be designed for coordination, not cost savings, and should be pursued with public engagement rather than imposed from above.

7.4 “The Bay Area Is Too Large and Diverse”

At 7.7 million people and 7,000 square miles, the Bay Area is large—but not unprecedented. The Greater London Authority governs 9 million people. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government governs 14 million. New York City governs 8.3 million in 303 square miles, while its metropolitan area exceeds 20 million. Scale is manageable with the right institutional design.

Diversity—ethnic, economic, and cultural—is a reason *for* consolidation, not against it. The current system concentrates wealth in some jurisdictions and poverty in others,

reinforcing segregation. A unified government with a shared tax base would be better positioned to address regional inequality.

7.5 “Incremental Cooperation Is Sufficient”

The Bay Area has been pursuing incremental cooperation for 65 years, since ABAG’s founding in 1961. The results speak for themselves: 27 transit agencies that still do not coordinate fares, 101 zoning codes that still do not produce enough housing, and regional bodies that still lack binding authority. Incrementalism is not failing because it has not been tried. It is failing because it has been tried and found wanting.

8 Conclusion

The San Francisco Bay Area is one of the most productive, innovative, and naturally beautiful regions on Earth. It is also one of the most dysfunctionally governed. Nine counties, 101 cities, 27 transit agencies, and 200 special districts produce a housing crisis, a transit crisis, fiscal inequality, and a democratic deficit that collectively diminish the region’s potential and harm its residents.

The case for consolidation rests on evidence from the Bay Area’s own history, from American and international case studies, and from the quantitative costs of fragmentation. Every successful world city—New York, London, Tokyo—has undergone some form of metropolitan consolidation. The Bay Area has not, and the costs are visible in every unaffordable rent payment, every missed bus connection, and every housing proposal vetoed by a suburban city council.

Greater San Francisco would be a city of 7.7 million people with a \$1.3 trillion economy, a unified transit system, a single planning authority, and a directly elected mayor who could speak for the entire region. Its nine boroughs would preserve local identity while ending the fragmentation that currently makes the region less than the sum of its parts.

The question is not whether consolidation is desirable—the evidence overwhelmingly suggests it is. The question is whether the Bay Area’s residents and political leaders have the vision to pursue it. The first step is the most achievable: unify the 27 transit agencies into a single Bay Area Transit Authority. The rest can follow. But the status quo—the quiet, comfortable, enormously costly status quo—is not an option the region can afford to maintain.

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